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INTRODUCTION A BRIEF GLANCE AT 

ATTORNEYS' FEES AFTER ALYESKA 

Hon. James L. Oakes* 
When the Supreme Court decIded Alyeska Pipeline Servfce 
Co. v. Wilderness SOCtety 1 reaffirmmg the Amencan Rule that a 
prevailing party IS generally not entitled to attorneys fees, 2 it 
merely altered the parameters of litigation over attorneys fees; it 
did not end the controversy ThIS sympOSIUm addresses many of 
the Issues that remam. ThIS mtroductIon IS mtended to prOVIde a 
background to, and delineate some of, those Issues without pre­
empting the authors of the commentanes that follow 
The Court m Alyeska was disturbed by a growmg tendency of 
the lower federal courts to permit an award of attorneys fees to 
partIes vmdicatmg the public mterest" by actmg as pnvate attor­
neys general."3 The "pnvate attorney general" concept had found 
perhaps its most eXpanSIOnIst expressIOn m La Raza Untda v. 
Volpe 4 In that case the distnct court, after enJommg a hIghway 
construction project for failure to comply with statutory housmg 
relocation reqUIrements, awarded attorneys fees agamst the Cali­
fornIa HIghway and Public Works Departments as well as agamst 
the ChIef Highway Engmeer m hIS mdividual and representative 
capacity The deCISIon may have envIsaged: 
[A]n era of the law s developmg its own mternal self-sustammg 
mstituhon meetmg the SOCIal demand for law aChvely to sub­
serve the public mterest m enVIronmental protechon--creatmg 
m three steps (1) a public nght, (2) persons (or objects) with 
U.S. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
1. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
2. The Court In Alyeska gave speCIal heed to an article by Professor John 
Dawson, 421 U.S. at 258 (citing Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney 
Fees from Funds, 87 HARV L. REv 1597 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dawson IJ). See 
also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients m Public Interest Litigation, 88 
HARV L. REv 849 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson Ill. 
3. See 421 U.S. at 270 nA6 (citations omitted). 
4. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). Interest­
Ingly even after Alyeska, California as matter of state law appears to permit the 
award of fees for the Vindication of state constitutional nghts under pnvate attor­
ney general" concept. See Serrano Pnest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 315 (1977). 
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standing to assert that nght, and (3) provIding the means for 
paymg the lawyers and techmcal experts who do the work to as­
sert the nght. Thus evolves democracy lit thIs wondrous law­
onented socIety of ours. 5 
Alyeska has effectively ended the vlSlonary fanciful, or rather 
fnghtenmg--depending on the VIewer s perspectIve-scheme of 
thmgs foreshadowed by La Raza Umda. But it has left open four 
doors6 for the award of attorneys fees. 
First, Congress may authonze the award of attorneys fees by 
statute. 7 Many statutes authonzmg these awards predate Alyeska. 8 
New statutes have been adopted,9 perhaps the most Important of 
whICh IS the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 10 
Since Alyeska, at least four major questions have been litigated un­
der these statutes: (1) Whether they permit the award of fees m 
connectIOn with litigation commenced pnor to statutory enactment; 
(2) whether, when statutes provIde for awards to the prevailing 
party m the tnal court's discretion, presumptive rules should dif­
ferentIate between prevailing plamtiffs and defendants; (3) whether 
attorneys fees are an element of costs or of damages. If they are an 
element of damages, then postjudgment mterest IS allowable; (4) 
whether the statutes permit fees to legal organlZatIons, such as le­
gal aId SOCIetIes and some public mterest" law firms, that are par 
tIally funded by the government. 
Followmg the Supreme Court's mterpretatIon of the Emer­
gency School AId Act of 1972,11 subsequently applied m respect to 
5. Oakes, EnVironmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions 
for the Future, 5 CONN. L. REV 531, 538 (1973). 
6. What I call the "fourth door allows the award of attorneys fees In federal 
diversity cases where the applicable state law permits it. But thIS exception IS often 
redundant with the Alyeska conclusIOn, SInce most states themselves follow the re­
stnctive Amencan Rule. 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. As such, and as otherwIse of little 
moment, thIS door IS not discussed In thIS Introduction. 
7 421 U.S. at 263 (1975). 
8. See 421 U.S. at 260 n.33; Oakes, Awarding Attorneys Fees After Alyeska, In 
2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 598 (1976). 
9. See Solovy & Barnard, Attorneys Fees In Commerc,al and Civil Rights Ac 
tions, In 2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 760 (1979) (list 
mcluding newer statutes); NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, Oct. 2, 1978, at 8. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See generally LIpson, Beyond Alyeska-;/udiclal 
Response to the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act, 22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 243 (1978); 
Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 
1976,21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 430 (1977); Note, The Civil Rights Attorney Fee Awards 
Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN S L. REV 562 (1978); Comment, Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Awards Act of 1976,34 WASH. & LEE L. REV 205 (1977). 
11. See Bradley School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 
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the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976,12 most lower 
federal courts have allowed the award of fees m cases commenced 
pnor to the statutory enactment. 13 
The Supreme Court has answered the questIon whether differ 
ent standards should govern the award of attorneys fees to a pre­
vailing party plamtiff or a prevailing party defendant, by endorsmg 
a presumptIve award to plamtiffs. The Court, however, reqUIres 
more specific findings for an award to defendants. Thus, III Newman 
v. Piggte Park Enterpnses, 14 the Court held that, under the pre­
vailing party language of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a 
prevailing plamtiff should ordinarily recover an attorney s fee un­
less specIal cIrcumstances would render [that] award unJust."15 The 
prevailing plamtiff standard was followed m Northcross v. Board of 
Educatron,16 an educatIonal CIvil nghts case, and m Albennarle Pa­
per Co. v. Moody 17 a title VII case. In Chnstiansburg Garment 
Co. v. Equal Employment Opportumty CommlsslOn,18 however 
the Court applied a different test to a defendant prevailing under 
title VII. ReJectmg both the prevailing plamtiff standard and the 
suggestIon that a defendant should recover only when the actIon 
was brought m bad faith, the Court held that fees may be awarded 
upon a finding that the plamtiffs action was fnvolous, unreason­
able, or without foundatIon, even though not brought m subjective 
bad faith. "19 Presumably a SImilar standard would apply to other 
comparable statutes. 
The thIrd questIon, whether fees are costs or damages, has 
1617 (1976) (repealed effective Sept. 30, 1979, and replaced by the identical 20 
U.S.C.A. § 3205 (West Cum. Supp. 1979»). See also Walker, Recovery of Attorney 
Fees In Civil Rights Litigation, 39 ALA. LAW 93 (1978). 
12. See Hutto Finney 437 U.S. 678, 694 n.23 (1978) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 
1988 (1976». 
13. Holley v. LavIne, Nos. 79-7182, 79-7190, 79-7207, slip op. at 3725 (2d Cir. 
July 13, 1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 
U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888); Pickett Milam, 579 F.2d 1118, ll20 
(8th Cir. 1978); Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), 
rev d on other grounds, 99 S.Ct. 1355 (1979). 
14. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per cunam). 
15. ld. at 402. 
16. 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per cunam) (construIng the Emergency School 
Aid Act of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19 (1976». 
17 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (dictum) (§ 706(k) of Title VIl of Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976»; see Chnstiansburg Garment Co. EEOC, 
434 U.S. 412,417 (1978) (dictum). See also, e.g., Carnon v. Yeshiva Univ 535 F.2d 
722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976). 
18. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
19. ld. at 421. 
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been answered differently by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuit. 2o The fourth questIon, whether a state­
funded plamtiff's attorney IS entitled to fees, has receIved varymg 
answers from different courts, with most favonng the award. 21 
Recent cases have held that even where a nonconstitutIonal 
claIm IS mvolved,22 attorneys fees may be awarded from state de­
fendants despite the eleventh amendment, at least when Congress
23IS exercIsmg its fourteenth amendment sectIon 5 powers. But 
several Important Issues remam unresolved, mcluding the use of 
pendent Junsdictlon to brmg nonconstitutlonal clrums withm the 
purvIew of a congressIOnal act, the standards pertrulllng to the ex­
erCIse of the court's discretIOn thereunder; the applicability of an 
act to government offiCIals and the United States itself, whether as 
losmg or prevailing24 partIes; and compensatIon for legal servIces 
rendered m admIlllstratlve proceedings,25 all of whIch are dis­
cussed m depth withm the pages of thIS symposmm. 
20. Compare Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316, 1321-23 (5th Cir. 
1978) (holding fees to be costs, not pennitting award of Interest thereon) with Per­
kins Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1973) (treating attorneys fees as 
damages, pennitting award of mterest). The Carpa case appears the better reasoned 
In light of the cost" language In the pnvate suit proVISIOn of the Clayton Act. 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
21. See, e.g., Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 
48 U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888) (attorneys fees reduced to reflect pub­
lic funding); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 
1978); Perez Rodnguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978). 
22. Gagne Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 48 
U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888). 
23. ld. (retroactive relief); Fitzpatnck Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 571-72 (2nd Cir. 
1975), aff'd In part, rev d In part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (prospective relief). See also 
Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir. 
1978); Bond Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1977), cen. demed, 438 U.S. 
916 (1978). 
24. See Comment, United States as Prevailing Defendant m Title VII Actions: 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, 66 GEO. L.J. 899 (1978). 
25. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., allowed recovery m title VII suit 
for servIces rendered m successful state adminIstrative proceedings, under the 'fed­
eral mandate [m title VII] of accommodation to state action. 598 F.2d 1253, 1257, 
cen. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3235 (Oct. 9, 1979) (No. 79-192) (quoting VoutSlS Umon 
CarbIde Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1971), cen. demed, 406 U.S. 918 (1972». 
Parker Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977), pennitted award of fees In title 
VII case covermg servlCes in pnor federal admlmstrative proceedings. But cf. 
Fitzgerald United States Civil Serv Comm n, 554 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dis­
allowed award under Veterans Preference Act where no express statutory proVISIOn 
for fees was found. 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1976». See also Note, Civil Rights-Title 
VII-Recovery of Attorneys Fees for ServIces Rendered In Connection with Admm­
Istrative Proceedings, 24 WAYNE L. REv 1409, 1419-20 (1978). 
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A second door to the award of attorneys fees left open by 
Alyeska IS the old equitable common fund" or "common benefit" 
doctnne. 26 Alyeska leaves unclear how wIde thIS openmg IS. The 
text of Mr JustIce White s opmlon reads "benefit" as broadly as 
the language of Trustees v. Greenough27 permits, refemng to a 
"power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property or a 
party preservmg or recovenng a fund for the benefit of others . , 
to recover hIS costs, mcluding attorneys fees, from the fund or 
property or directly from the other partIes enJoymg the bene­
fit."28 A later footnote, however, narrows the constructIon to classes 
of beneficianes whICh are small m number and easily Identifiable, 
and where the benefits could be traced with some accuracy so that 
the costs could be shifted to those truly benefitmg.29 
While we may only speculate, the Court's recent declSlon to 
reVIew Van Gernert v. Boemg Co. 30 may reflect a desrre to clarify 
the scope of the common benefit" doctnne. In Van Gernert, a suc­
cessful class actIOn suit on behalf of nonconvertmg debenture hold­
ers,31 the court of appeals allowed the attorneys an award based on 
the total fund recovered even though not all the members of the 
class had filed clrums for recovery The dissent argued that non­
26. See generally Mills v. ElectriC Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1969) (awarding 
Intenm attorneys fees to minority stockholders who, sUing to set aside their corpora­
tion merger, established VIOlation of ~ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 14a-9 thereunder pertaining to proxy disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976»; 
Sprague Tacomc Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (trust benefiCiary 
establishing own nght to lien on trust fund sale may obtain attorneys fees out of pro­
ceeds; case IS often cited for dicta, based upon the broad power of equity as applied 
through stare deCISIS, where the "fund IS for all practical purposes created for the 
benefit of others. Id. at 167); Central R.R. & Bankmg Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 
(1885) (lawyer may recover attorneys fees not only from hiS clients but also from 
other parties benefiting from hiS efforts to establish lien on property); Trustees v. 
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (party brlngmg suit to rescue trust fund and restore 
it to its proper purposes may recover fees from the fund as means of enforcmg con­
tribution to hiS attorneys fees from hiS cobeneficlanes of the fund); Smolowe v. 
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cere. dented, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (attor­
neys fees recoverable under unjust ennchment theory In action under § 16(b) of 
1934 Act, although no express proVISIOn proVides such, and express proVISIOns do ex­
ISt under §§ 9(e) and 18(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976»; Dawson I, 
supra note 2; Dawson II, supra note 2. 
27. 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 
28. 421 U.S. at 257 (footnote omitted). 
29. Id. at 264 n.39. 
30. 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cere. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979) 
(No. 78-1327) (Van Gernert IV). 
31. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cere. dented, 423 U.S. 947 (1975) (Van Gernert I). 
See also Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Gernert II). 
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claImmg members were not clients of the attorneys for the named 
class, if they were even partIes to the suit,32 and that the award 
was, therefore, a "lawyer s wmdfall. "33 Given the concern ex­
pressed by some Judges over possible abuse of class actions by law­
yers,34 one may not safely predict the outcome ofVan Gernert. 35 
Regardless of how Van Gernert IS decIded, senous problems 
remaIn m determmmg the amount of fees to be awarded, and to 
whom the award extends, m common benefit" cases, whICh IS a 
subject covered m thIS symposmm. Some of the decIded cases de­
lineate the problems, mcluding when negotiations for attorneys 
fees should be conducted,36 the factors to be used m determmmg 
the amount of the fees,37 and whether discovery of defense coun­
sel's hours IS appropnate as a baSIS for companson with plaIntiff's 
time. 38 
The thIrd door to recovery of attorneys fees left open m 
Alyeska-for vexatious, bad faith, wanton, or oppreSSIve action by 
the losmg party39_not only has a longstanding hIstory of Supreme 
Court approval,40 but enJoys faIrly frequent usage. Since Alyeska, 
32. 590 F.2d at 442, 443 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). But see 590 F.2d at 
440 n.15 (Kaufman, C.J.) ("the class [Is] the attorney client for all practical pur­
poses") (emphasIs In ongmal) (citing Note, Developments In the Law: Class Actions, 
89 HARV L. REV 1318, 1592-97 (1976)). The majority specifically stated that it did 
not express any view as to the appropriate ultimate disposition of the unclaimed re­
mamder of the fund. ld. at 440 n.17. The dissent was completely silent on thiS Issue. 
But see Van Gernert Boemg Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Gernert II). 
33. 590 F.2d at 443. The dissent also argued that smce the common fund" 
doctrine was created to prevent unjust enrichment, there can be no recovery since 
no benefit IS conferred without clrum and knowmg acceptance of the benefit. Id. 
at 444. 
34. E.g., Van Gernert v. Boemg Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (Van 
Gernert Ill). 
35. Irrespective of that outcome, the author stands by hiS differentiation be­
tween attorneys fees and disbursements, as set forth In the dissent to the panel 
oplmon m Van Gernert Ill. Van Gernert v. Boemg Co., 573 F.2d 733, 738 (1978). 
36. Prandim v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977) (after mam class 
action IS settled, to aVOid possible conflict of Interests). 
37. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (numerous 
factors detennlnmg whether baSIC hourly fee should be mcreased or decreased); 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (twelve fac­
tors for same purpose). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, .Dis­
clplinary Rule 2-107. A sophisticated diSCUSSIOn of the cases dealing with the criteria 
for the award of attorneys fees appears In Solovy & Barnard, supra note 9, at 774. 
38. See Rabb, Attorney Fees In Civil Rights Actions, m 2 CURRENT PROB­
LEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 865 (1979) (list of cases). 
39. 421 U.S. at 258-59. 
40. E.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rei. International Lumber Co., 417 
U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maler Brewmg Co., 386 U.S. 
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thIS exceptIon to the AmerIcan rule has been used to award attor­
neys fees m a class action suit agamst a hospital and local mavor 
refusmg to pennit abortIons,41 m a prIsoners rIghts suit,42 m a 
housmg discnmmatIon case,43 m a teacher s discharge suit,44 and 
most recently m a title VII case. 45 Of course, if a suit IS only m­
substantial but not m bad faith, fees will not be awarded under thIs 
rule. 46 One distrIct court, m a novel case, has assessed a $50,000 
award agamst an unsuccessful plamtiff's lawyer and hIs law finn for 
a suit that the court found baseless. 47 The questIon remams 
whether the vexatIous or bad faith conduct must occur m the han­
dling of the litIgation itself, as some courts hold,48 or may mclude 
an opponent's conduct whICh necessitates the litIgation, as held by 
others.49 The author tends to support the first of these two theones 
m the belief that oppreSSIve conduct leading to the litIgatIon can 
714, 718 (1967); Vaughan Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Toledo Scale Co. 
v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923). 
41. Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546-48 (8th Cir. 1975), rev d on other 
grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per cunam). See also Cormst v Richland Parish School 
Bd., 517 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975) (per cunam) (case mvolvIng raCially discnm­
matory finngs remanded for possible award of fees based on bad faith). 
42. Miller Carson, 401 F Supp. 835, 845-57 (M.D. Fla. 1975). 
43. Clemons Runck, 402 F Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. OhIO 1975). 
44. Morns v. Board of Educ., 401 F Supp. 188,215 (D. Del. 1975). 
45. Copeland Martinez, 48 U.S.L.W 2089 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1979). 
46. Wimberly MiSSIOn Broadcasting Co., 523 F.2d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(no attorneys fees for unsuccessful IndiVidual pnvate action by veteran for re­
employment follOWIng military discharge); United States Ford Motor Co., 522 
F.2d 962, 967 (6th Cir. 1975) (no attorneys fees for defending agamst employer who 
sought Injunction that was ruled msubstantial and with little merit, though not fnvo­
lous); Hallmark Climc v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 519 F.2d 1315, 
1317 (4th Cir. 1975) (no attorneys fees agamst Human Resources Department as part 
of executive department; none agamst IndiViduals because no bad faith when at­
tempting to Implement new statutes responsive to new constitutional doctnne); 
Hander v. San JacInto Jumor College, 519 F.2d 273, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1975) (no attor­
neys fees for wrongfully discharged public Jumor college teacher m VIOlation of 
fourteenth amendment SInce VIOlation does not fall withIn the four Alyeska excep­
tions); Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Tex. 1975), rev d on other 
grounds, 551 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1977), rev d on other grounds, 437 U.S. 535 (1978) 
(no attorneys fees for successful constitutional challenge of city at large method of 
electing city council members smce there was no bad faith); Walther & Cie U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397 F Supp. 937, 946 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (no attorneys fees smce 
defendant' failure to consummate settlement agreement m timely manner did not 
amount to bad faith). 
47. Nemeroff Abelson, 469 F Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (appeal pending). 
48. Straub V VOlsman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3rd Cir. 1976); Tze Zing Yao 
v. W.E. Hutton & Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) ~ 96,039 
at 91,652 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
49. Bogart v. Unified School Dist. No. 298, 432 F Supp. 895, 906 (D. Kan. 
1977); LeWIS v. Texaco, 418 F Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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ordinarily be compensated for through the doctnne of punitive 
damages. Although logIc may permit the award of attorneys fees, 
even as authonzed by statute, it may nevertheless, be outweIghed 
In a gIVen case In whIch the punitive damages have been substan­
tIal. 50 
These three Alyeska exceptions by themselves suggest that the 
editors of the Western New England Law Revtew have chosen an 
Increasmgly Important tOPIC for thIS symposIUm, and one of 
grOWIng Interest to lawyers and clients alike. The skyrocketIng cost 
of litigatIon alone makes the tOPIC alive. Statutory proposals such as 
The Equal Access to Justice Act,51 whIch would proVIde citIZens 
and small bUSInesses reImbursement In prevailing litigation with 
the government, make the tOpIC even more SIgnificant for the fu­
ture. After twenty years of practice and ten years of observation 
from the bench, I am well aware that the allocatIon and amount of 
attorneys fees and costs have tremendous Impact not only on the 
bnngIng and settling of litIgatIon but also on achIeVIng real JustIce. 
I am honored to have been chosen to write thIS survey of the prob­
lem, a problem for whIch Alyeska set some parameters but did not 
resolve. 
50. See Zarcone Perry 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 
1072 (1979) (attorneys fees were disallowed In part because the punitive damages 
award had been suffiCient). 
51. S. 265, 96th Congo 1st Sess. (1979) (passed United States Senate on July 31, 
1979 pending with United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judi­
ciary). 
